Linus Torvalds är inte känd för att uttrycka sig oklart när det kommer till hur han känner kring olika sakfrågor.
I fråga om Secure Boot, där Microsoft sitter med makten i hand eftersom de är ensamma om att godkänna eller avslå certifikaten för att boota Linux på Windows 8-maskiner, skräder han inte heller på orden. Red Hat-utvecklaren David Howells skickade en pull request till Linus:
Can you pull this patchset please?
It provides a facility by which keys can be added dynamically to a kernel that is running in secure-boot mode. To permit a key to be loaded under such a condition, we require that the new key be signed by a key that we already have (and trust) – where keys that we ”already have” could include those embedded in the kernel, those in the UEFI database and those in cryptographic hardware.
Varvid Linus svarade:
Not without a lot more discussion first. Quite frankly, this is f*cking moronic. The whole thing seems to be designed around stupid interfaces, for completely moronic reasons. Why should we do this? I already dislike our existing X.509 parser. And this makes the idiotic complicated interfaces, and now it goes up to 11.
Då la sig Matthew Garrett, mannen bakom UEFI-bootloadern shim, i diskussionen:
There’s only one signing authority, and they only sign PE binaries.
(PE-binärer är Portable Executable, ett Windows-format, red.anm.) Varvid Linus exploderade med ungefär den samlade kraften av alla mer eller mindre upprörda Linux-användarna i världen, men som inte har cohones eller bakgrunden för att protestera:
Guys, this is not a dick-sucking contest. If you want to parse PE binaries, go right ahead.
If Red Hat wants to deep-throat Microsoft, that’s *your* issue. That has nothing what-so-ever to do with the kernel I maintain. It’s trivial for you guys to have a signing machine that parses the PE binary, verifies the signatures, and signs the resulting keys with your own key. You already wrote the code, for chissake, it’s in that f*cking pull request.
Why should *I* care? Why should the kernel care about some idiotic ”we only sign PE binaries” stupidity? We support X.509, which is the standard for signing.
Do this in user land on a trusted machine. There is zero excuse for doing it in the kernel.
Varvid Garrett argumenterade för sin linje:
Vendors want to ship keys that have been signed by a trusted party. Right now the only one that fits the bill is Microsoft, because apparently the only thing vendors love more than shitty firmware is following Microsoft specs.
Mer av den eldiga diskussionen kan läsas på Muktware.
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